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ABSTRACT
We examine a structural deficiency in the healthcare system that hinders implementation of a
meaningful cost accounting system, and suggest an alternative organizational arrangement that can
facilitate introducing cost control mechanisms. We argue that hospitals need structural
rearrangement so that cost-driving activities can be traced, and their costs allocated to responsibility
centers. We suggest that this structural rearrangement is a precondition for implementing any
meaningful activity-based cost management system. We also suggest a basic framework for value
analysis of activities for healthcare providers, and discuss how this framework can be used as a
vehicle for controlling diagnostic costs ..

Background
American political leaders are concerned about increases in healthcare costs and are
attempting to identifY the problems in healthcare administration. Some critics of the present
healthcare system warn of the possibility of sky-rocketing healthcare cost bankrupting the
American economy in the next few decades. An Activity Based Cost Accounting (ABC)
system has been suggested as an effective tool to manage and control costs in hospitals
(Chari, 1993). ABC is receiving a lot of attention among corporate controllers and other cost
accounting professionals. By distinguishing value-added from non-valued activities and
focusing on reducing the cost of non-valued activities, organizations can achieve cost
savings without damaging the quality of products or services offered (Cooper and Kaplan,
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1991). This approach to cost control is well established in the manufacturing sector (Hawks,
Bondies, Strong and Reid 1992; Bhimani and Pigott, 1992).
Unlike manufacturing industries, hospitals and other service sector organizations have
an inseparable reciprocal relationship between the service delivery process and the service
outcomes. Therefore, it is much more complicated and difficult to introduce an ABC system
of cost management in hospital organizations. Further, in this paper we point out the
structural impediments to implementing an activity based management system in a hospital.
In attempting to examine the possibility of introducing an ABC system, we considered
that there are fundamental structural problems that inhibit cost management in the
healthcare industry. In service organizations, efficiency improvements are inherently tied to
improving labor productivity (Hemeon, 1989). In developing measures of employee
activities in service organizations, it has been suggested that the time spent by employees
for various activities be sampled at representative points in time (Crane and Meyer, 1993;
Hilton, 1991). The time data can then be transformed to cost information.
In one pre-arranged instance, we attempted to sample cost data in a hospital based on
guidelines suggested in the accounting literature. Based on our analysis of the sampled data,
we made recommendations to rearrange employees' activities in order to improve the cost
management system, particularly those of laboratory technicians. The hospital
administrators strongly opposed any such rearrangement of activities. They argued that the
lab was operating at full capacity, and hence, the rearrangement of activities would not help
reduce costs. This and similar incidents have made us believe that certain pre-conditions
must be met before any cost management is considered seriously. Systemic incentives must
be provided to all the constituents involved in order to attempt substantive cost control in a
hospital.
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In the United Kingdom attempts are currently underway to implement management
information systems that are founded on the principles of activity based cost management
systems (Holford and McAulay, 1987a and 1987b). The National Health Service (NHS) in
the U.K. found that unless physicians are held accountable for the budgets they have
traditionally prepared, administrators will find it difficult to hold anyone accountable for
cost overruns in the hospital departments. NHS would like physicians to be responsible for
preparing budgets along "patient portfolios" rather than along functional lines. This belief
of NHS is a necessary first step for requiring departments to analyze their activities along
specialties (i. e., treatment groups) they care for. The NHS believes this would avoid
arbitrary allocations that are presently necessary to arrive at the full costs of providing
treatments to particular diagnosis related treatment groups. However, an NHS enforced,
unilateral approach to introducing the necessary information system is not likely to succeed
in the U.S. because in the U.S. physicians typically are not employees of a hospital, or of a
central agency such as the NHS. Hence, there is a need for structural rearrangement to align
incentives of U.S. physicians with those of the hospitals in which they practice.
Founded on such conclusions, we undertake the following tasks in this paper: (1) we
examine the structural deficiency in the healthcare system which we believe prevents costJournal of Management Systems, Volume 6, Number 3, 1994
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management; (2) suggest an alternative organizational arrangement which can better align
the incentives of healthcare providers (we believe that this structural rearrangement is a
precondition for implementation of the meaningful, activity-based cost management
system), and (3) suggest a basic framework of value analysis which can be used to analyze
healthcare service activities.
Current Structural Arrangement in For-Profit Hospitals and Cost Management
The current structural arrangement of for-profit hOspitals can be summarized as a
"dual-control" system: professional medical services are controlled by a group of senior
physicians and administrative services are controlled by hospital staff administrators.
Although hospital administrative executives may have formal authority over professional
services in a hospital, they will rarely exercise their authority to overrule the medical
practices of physicians. Practically, administrators may not have power over medical
professionals, as argued by strategic contingency theorists (e.g., Pfeffer, 1983; Hinings,
Hickson, Pennings and Schneck, 1974). This is because medical professionals, especially
physicians, contribute to critical resources (i. e., patients), upon which hospitals depend.
This "dual control" system is well illustrated in an actual organization chart of a local
hospital the authors studied (See Exhibit 1).

The formal organizational chart of the hospital depicted in Exhibit I is modified to
show actual lines of authority among functions and positions. The executive administrative
director has direct control of non-medical staff functions. He has formal authority over
medical services, though no real and direct formal control over professional service
functions, as noted by the broken lines. On the other hand, the executive committee of
physicians and dentists has direct influence over all professional, medical service activities.
They, in fact, have significantly more influence over various staff service activities than
executive administrators do. The dual authority system of this local hospital is not a-typical
for hospitals.
The Hospital Administrators
In most traditional investor owned hospitals, administration is separated from the
activities of delivering medical services. Most of the physicians serving in a hospital are
effectively customers of the hospitals (independent contractors). The physicians bring their
own patients to the hospital and book use of the hospital facilities on behalf of their patients.
Even when administration is involved in managing all the departments that provide various
treatment-related services, including diagnostic lab tests, they have little or no influence
over clinical decisions for extensive diagnostic testing. By not being engaged in clinical
decisions, hospital administrators are removed from direct responsibility for the cost
effectiveness of patient care. As long as hospital expenses are recovered, the administrators
have significant disincentives to interfere with physicians' professional autonomy. The
hospital administration has a symbiotic-relationship with physicians. By having such a
structural arrangement, both parties benefit: the administrators avoid clinical responsibility
and the physicians maximize professional autonomy without administrative interference. In
terms of cost control, the administrators are largely concerned with cost recovery. As long
as cost is recovered (including cost of capital), more services and more tests are better for
hospitals than less. In fact, increased volume of services rendered does not seem to be a
Journal of Management Systems, Volume 6, Number 3, 1994

MANAGING HEALTHCARE COSTS THROUGH STRUCTURAL REARRANGEMENT

25

EXHIBIT 1
MILLCREEK' HOSPITAL
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
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problem as long as the administrators appropriately screen patients for payment ability.
Even for this screening of qualified patients, the administrators can rely on physicians to a
certain extent.
In this traditional arrangement of hospital organizations, the critical uncertainty or the
real strategic goal of profit-seeking hospitals is higher occupancy rate and more treatments,
for which the administrators are critically dependent upon independent physicians. Since
most of the high price-tag services are paid by a third party, typically an insurance company
or the government, higher occupancy and more treatment is the implicit rule of the game for
investor-owned hospitals. Hence, influence of administrators over medical professionals is
limited. Thus, with an unaccountable relationship, cost management is of low importance to
independent physicians (Glandon and Morrisey, 1986).
In Exhibit 1, the organization's control line for the administrative executive, (who
tends to be more cost-conscious), is even thinner than the control line of the professional
services executive, who has little or no incentive for cost containment. In fact, by having
such a dual control system, each control line may deflect more troublesome cost issues to
the other side.

•

The Medical Professionals
Physicians are professionally trained to effectively treat symptoms of injury and
disease. Because of the need to minimize malpractice claims, physicians also have an
incentive to over-provide the most comprehensive care in treatment of the patients'
symptoms. It is frequently the case that ordering all tests is a safer defense than not doing
some test, which can be a devastating fault in a court hearing. In addition, because of the
physicians' customer status (independent contractor) and the dual control system, hospital
administrators rarely make any attempt to curb the physicians' clinical autonomy. In such a
context, with little or no incentive for cQst effective diagnoses, medical professionals are
less concerned with direct costs involved in treating particular symptoms of a disease.
For example, more than $25 million is spent nationwide on tests to diagnose jaundice
in newborn children. Newman, Easterling, Goldman, and Stevenson (1990) questioned the
need for the whole battery of tests shown in Exhibit 2. According to these authors, a more
cost effective way to diagnose jaundice in a newborn is to check the mother's medical
history, do a thorough physical examination of the newborn, and check the initial
hematocritic levels. Bilirubin tests and Reticulocyte count are of questionable value for
jaundice evaluation. The fact that physicians routinely request the whole battery of tests
lead us to believe that medical practice emphasizes the value of all diagnosing procedures
more than the value of a patient's history and a thorough physical examination of the
patient.
Given the present legal system and hospital/physician structural arrangement,
physicians have little incentive to question the value of extensive diagnostic procedures.
This is due to the high costs involved for not performing the procedures (e.g., the costs of
malpractice litigation and the damage to professional reputation). These approaches have
become institutionalized in healthcare organizations.
Journal of Management Systems, Volume 6, Number 3, 1994
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EXHIBIT 2
CHARGES AT UCSF' FOR TESTS TO
EVALUATE JAUNDICE IN NEWBORNS
Tests

UCSF Charges

- Bilirubin
Direct
Total
- Complete Blood Count
- Blood Type
- Blood Group
- Direct Coombs
- Reticulocyte Count
- Red Blood Cell
Total

$19.75
7.75
21.00
12.00
12.00
25.00
19.00
8.00
$124.50

Source: University of California, San Francisco, Medical Center. (Newman, B.T., J.,
Easterling, E.S. Goldman, and D.K. Stevenson, "Laboratory Evaluation of Jaundice in
Newborns," American Journal ojDiagnosis, No. 144, 1990, p. 364).
One way or another, patients are screened in terms of their ability to pay. Most of the
prestigious physicians maintain a list of "financially qualified" patients. Hospital
administrators are more concerned about the reputation of the physicians than about their
style of practicing medicine. On the part of hospital administrators, recruiting outstanding
physicians is a competitive process: a process that includes attracting physicians by offering
state-of-the-art diagnostic and technical facilities. For physicians, maintaining their clinical
reputation is far more important than delivering a "cost-control" reputation.
A hospital that has superior facilities and allows greater autonomy to physicians, has
greater ability to attract physicians. In other words, in this arrangement, the important
strategic concern of physicians is maintaining their professional, clinical reputation
regardless of resources consumed. Clearly, cost control is a low priority to them. Quite
naturally, as pointed out earlier, physicians thus gain power within healthcare organizations
(i. e., Critical contingency theory, Hinings et ai, 1974). This explains why the professional
control line in Exhibit 1 is thicker than the administrative line.
Other Constituents: Lab Technicians, Nurses, and Patients
Lab clinicians are dejJendent on physicians' work orders. More tests mean keeping
their lab open, and keeping technicians employed. The administration helps lab technicians
operate in full or even expanded capacity. Frequently, the more rare and expensive tests
accrue to the technicians' advantage, enhancing their professional experience opportunities.
Journal of Management Systems, Volume 6, Number 3, 1994
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In other words, lab technicians are also shielded from cost control incentives, and may not
be structurally part of cost or price related decision activity for their services.
Nurses also have little control over the administrative as well as the clinical decisions.
Little incentive exists for cost contaimnent by nurses, as long as they comply with
administrative policies and, more importantly, with physicians' instructions. In fact,
because administrators may not pressure nurses for managing costs or clinical decisions,
nurses are better off remaining neutral in their relationship with both administrators and
physicians. Nurses function as employees of the hospital, providing services for the
physicians.
Patients are concerned aboui the costs and bills they will receive. However, the
uncertainty and complexity related to medical diagnosis and its implications for prognosis
put patients largely at the mercy of healthcare professionals. As long as bills are
predominantly reimbursed by a third party (the govermnent or an insurance company),
patients generally follow the instructions of physicians to maximize, presumably, the
quality and benefits of medical services they receive.
Thus, in sununary, in investor owned hospitals, physicians have a substantial amount
of influence over the healthcare service delivery process. They are professionally
independent from other constituents, including hospital administration and insurance
companies. Physicians are primarily concerned with the delivery of medical services, rather
than the cost effectiveness of the delivery process. Other constituents in this arrangement
have neither the strategic interest nor the power to push for cost management.
Structural Arrangement in Not-For-Profit Hospitals and Cost Management
State-run hospitals and university-related hospitals are the two most prominent forms
of not-for-profit hospitals (though not the greatest number). The strategic goal of state-run
hospitals lies, formally at least, in providing medical services to all of the needy and
qualified, within their budgetary constraints. Becanse of their budgetary constraint and large
demand for services, it may be the case that all patients do not necessarily receive the same
quality of service as in a for-profit hospital. Patients often need to wait longer for care. For
some cases, these not-for-profit hospitals might actually be more cost-conscious because of
their budgetary constraints and demand for services. But, this does not necessarily mean
that they are operated on a more cost-effective basis. Cost can be kept within the budget by
minimizing the total long-run amount of patient care provided during a given time period,
without reducing the cost of patient care. As long as these not-for-profit hospitals can justify
the cost incurred, they do not have to concern themselves quite as much about the quantity
and quality of the treatments they provide over the long run.

University-related teaching hospitals are operated under largely the same cost principle
as not-for-profit state-owned hospitals. Most of the services, including diagnostic lab tests,
are reimbursed through a university-wide budgeting process. Educationally justified costs
are reimbursed. Economical ways of conducting tests or screening what to test and what not
to test (cost efficiency and cost effectiveness) is not a predominant principle. Rare tests
and/or more expensive tests are preferred because of their instructional value. For instance,
Journal of Management Systems, Volume 6, Number 3, 1994

MANAGING HEALTHCARE COSTS THROUGH STRUCTURAL REARRANGEMENT

29

in a case study we conducted in a university-related diagnostic lab, the hospital
administrators seemed to be more concerned about the volume of tests performed than the
cost efficiency and cost effectiveness of the tests. The critical uncertainty outside of the
administrators' direct control was the steady flow of teaching subjects, i.e., patients.
Because of the stated goal of education, any cost incurred in providing clinical tests was
easily justified. Exhibits 3 and 4 show the source of funds and the service price-cost
comparison for the study we conducted. All the expense incurred in the lab was recovered,
and the lab had a surplus: 81 % from service fees and 25% from the college, leaving a 6%
surplus.
One of the cost practices at this lab was as follows: their estimate for the budgeted level
of service for a given year was set equal to the previous year's level of service. At the
beginning of each year, the administrative staff conducted a physical count of inventories
and placed orders for materials based on the last year's volume. No attempt was made to
trace the materials cost of tests actually performed. However, the administrators
marginalized the importance of material control based on the reasoning that materials used
for these tests had little, if any, personal value to the technicians and would therefore not be
subject to mismanagement. Furthermore, the technicians were allegedly under-paid
compared to their counterparts in the industry, and hence, administrators seemed to believe
that providing the technicians with maximum control of their work environment, with
minimum interference, was one way to help retain good technicians. Thus, the
administrators believed that tighter work scheduling and detailed cost control efforts would
not contribute to the hospital's overall cost management efforts.

I

In spite of the above mentioned limitations, we sampled the work activities of the
technicians. We calculated the cost of some tests that were frequently requested. From our
calculations we found that three tests (out of 12 in our sample) did not even cover their own
prime costs (materials and labor) (See Exhibit 4).
As far as these tests were concerned, the greater the need for these tests, the greater the
need for funding. Without such cost information for activities (i.e., tests), administrators did
not know where to cut costs or how to require the physicians to evaluate costs and benefits
of the tests. But, since there was little incentive for cost saving, expansion through increased
expenditure, and consequently increased funding, when justifiable, served to promote the
interests of several constituents.
Each party involved in this type of organizational arrangement will have disincentives
to initiate a cost efficient and cost effective process for delivering healthcare service. Market
economists suggest that not-for-profit institutions may not have the proper incentives to
optimize their use of resources. They may be more concerned about the distribution of
healthcare services within the community they serve.

In both state-run and university-related hospitals, medical professionals may use the
hospital as a leaming and experimental site. They may enhance their own professional
experience or conduct research, putting cost at a lower priority. Thus, patients with a rare
Journal of Management Systems, Volume 6, Number 3, 1994
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EXHIBIT 3
SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR A
NOT-FOR-PROFIT DIAGNOSTIC LAB

Source of Funds

i

Amount

Percentage

Fee for Services
Funds from College
Funds Available

$389,193.00
120,152.00
$509,345.00

81%
25
106%

Total 91-92 Expenditure
Surplus

$482,800.00
26,545.00

100
+6%

Source: Authors' research of a diagnostic lab; this lab is part of a lmiversity-related hospital
function.

EXHIBIT 4
PRICE AND COST COMPARISON IN
THE DIAGNOSTIC LAB

Type of test

Tests that are subsidized:
AN-Antibody
Blood Gas
Blood Gas/Electrolytes
Sub-total

Volume

520
2,290
2,410

Revenue Labor
Cost

Prime
Cost

$10,400
16,023
36,135

$31,874 ($21,474)
36,074 (20,052)
62,610 (26,475)
($68,001)

$27,560
2,290
21,681

Contribution
(Loss)

Source: Authors' research of a diagnostic lab; this lab is part of a university-related hospital
function.
disease are welcomed even when costs for tests and treatments are usually high, since the
patients need to be treated and the illness has high experience value.
New Organizational Arrangement and Cost Management
There are three key factors that we attempt to balance in order to offer an improved
solution to the existing healthcare problems in the U.S.: to reduce the healthcare cost (cost
Journal of Management Systems, Volume 6, Number 3,1994
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control) without lowering the quality of services (cost effectiveness) offered to the largest
number of people who need the care (cost efficiency). The best mechanism that a
capitalistic society has provided for balancing these factors for goods and services is the
market pricing mechanism. In such a mechanism, over-priced services without comparable
quality will lose out to competitors. However, it seems that U.S. political leaders do not
want to allow free price competition for healthcare services for a number of important
reasons.
First, the consumer seems to find it difficult to tolerate healthcare quality differentials
based on price. In order to maintain "good" healthcare service and to train a qualified
medical professional, it takes a substantial amount of time and resources. Because of the
substantial idiosyncratic investment necessary, providers want to assume that quality is
given. Also, since healthcare tends to be commnnity-based, there may not be enough
providers in each county--especially in rural areas-to drive down prices through freemarket competition. In addition, there may be an overall loss of social welfare through the
potential loss of important resources and technology if medical professionals and
institutions fail due to unrestrained price competition.
Medical services provided today are also so complex in nature that it is not always easy
for even the well informed consumer to detennine quality differences. As a result of this
information asymmetry, medical professionals attain more autonomy and discretion than
other constituents in the healthcare industry. Ironically, it is this inability to accurately
measure quality of care that makes curbing medical cost increases even more difficult. In
the following section, we discuss some suggestions for a new structural arrangement to
achieve a balance on these three important issues: cost reduction, cost effectiveness, and
cost efficiency of services offered.
External Constraints
Beginning in 1983, many of the third party cost reimbursement agents, including many
insurance companies and the U.S. government, adopted a method of payment called the
Prospective Payment System (PPS). Under PPS, hospitals are paid a fixed fee per case
based on Diagnostic Related Groups (DRG) and physicians are paid according to a
Resource Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS) fee schedule for their services. These
mechanisms have proved to be effective in moderately curbing the rapidly escalating cost
problem for healthcare services. However, physicians still have medical and financial
incentives to do everything "beneficial" for patients, without inordinate concern about the
costs involved. Since hospital administrators do not assume clinical responsibility, they
thereby continue to encourage physicians to perfonn more tests and provide more services
that provide greater chargeable volume usage of the hospital. Hospitals and physicians still
maintain a symbiotic relationship in this regard.

As in the U.K., it seems that constraints outside of the healthcare industry are necessary
for controlling costs and delivering healthcare in a cost effective manner. However, setting
fixed prices for particular services alone may not direct the energies of medical
professionals and institutions toward optimizing the three factors of providing quality
service to the largest number of consumers at minimum prices. Hospital administrators and
Journal of Management Systems, Volume 6, Number 3, 1994
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physicians will still have an incentive to provide the largest volume of services, even at
predetermined prices. Unlike the U.K. and Canada, where there are a single payor systems
that ration the quantity of care by law, in the U.S. the multiple third party payor system
encourages the delivery of the maximum amount of services, making it difficult to manage
cost. It also implicitly rations care, but on the ad hoc basis of economic status, rather than
through open public policy debate.
One way of balancing the three factors would be to consider a new organizational
arrangement, putting administrators and physicians under one organizational structure. In
Exhibit I, this would be analogous to merging two control lines into one. This arrangement,
establishing an employer-employee relationship, is not new to organizational theorists,
though it may be quite radical to U.S. healthcare norms. It follows the traditional, productline based hierarchical organization of profit seeking enterprises. The organization as a
whole is responsible for services delivered to the market, and its success depends on market
competitiveness. To remain competitive, quality should be the highest possible, prices
should be the lowest possible, and hence, the production cost should be the lowest possible.
All parties involved in the process, employers and employees, are responsible for
.
optimizing the use of limited resources.
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and Preferred Provider Organizations
(PPOs) have come close to adopting this model. They have shown some success in
providing cost effective services without creating serious quality problems (Heintz and
McNerney, 1992). HMOs, as employers, effectively hire medical professionals as
employees and put them in a traditional organizational hierarchy. It has been pointed out
that under this arrangement, physicians' autonomy is substantially restricted (Glandon and
Morrisey, 1986). Physicians are supervised to a greater degree by administrators. The
increasing number of medical school graduates has enabled HMOs and PPOs to attract
enough professionals to run such organizations. A prime objective of this arrangement is to
align physicians' interest with the hospital's financial interest. In addition, the hospital as an
organization shares clinical responsibility with the physician. Thus, in such an arrangement,
all parties involved in providing healthcare services-hospital administrators, physicians,
clinical technicians, and nurses-share both financial and clinical risks of providing care for
the hospital's "portfolio" of patient care categories. This provides them with incentives to
devote their energies and resources into concerted actions to achieve the agreed-upon goals
for a particular group of patients. Cost effective care then becomes a more important
. strategic goal for the healthcare provider organization.

InternalltearrangeDlent
Under continued external pressure for cost control, traditional hospitals face the need
for organizational rearrangement. The suggested arrangement of employer-employee
relationship would put administrators and physicians in a more closely tied economic
relationship in managing healthcare. Their collective efforts will be necessary to respond to
changes imposed by the emerging national healthcare reform proposals. In other words, due
to external organizational competition and shared financial interests, hospitals and
physicians will have to work cooperatively to provide quality services at competitive prices,
plainly disclosed for public scrutiny. In order to accomplish this as a common goal, both
Journal of Management Systems, Volume 6, Number 3, 1994
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administrators and physicians must first cooperate in rearranging the existing organizational
structural relationships. Management budgets prepared by treatment categories and
monitored by physicians would become a reality.
One such internal structural rearrangement would be to shift from a functional
organization to a closely integrated "product" design. Since hospitals provide numerous
services, many of which are inter-related in terms of the skills needed and equipment used
for treatment, a "product" structure is a more appropriate form for grouping patient service
efforts. In a "product" structure, similar services that require similar skills and equipment
are grouped together in a unit, so that individuals can closely work together and be jointly
accountable for outcomes.
An important feature of this "product" structure is its focus on building a team, which
is collectively responsible for assessing market changes and meeting customers' needs. The
team in the product line identifies target customer groups and provides preventative and
comprehensive services to the target customers as a team. The team adjusts to changing
needs of the target market segment: e.g., the customers' demographic characteristics and
their special needs, price sensitivities of the service, external payment schemes, and other
external constraints. Furthermore, this product line management enables the hospital to
better assess its ability and resources available to compete in the customer segment. The
separate service units assesses whether the market they represent is appropriate and whether
they can develop and provide a long-term competitive advantage to the consumer. Most
importantly, this product line based structure serves as a profit center that is responsible for
the cost-efficiency and marketable quality and volume of patient care services at
competitive prices. Thus, both clinical and administrative responsibilities will be placed in
the team that actually provides the services. Once appropriate service teams and support
teams (cost centers) are established, costs of the support teams can be more meaningfully
allocated to the service teams using accurate and detailed resource drivers.
It is a well established cost accounting principle that an appropriate mechanism for cost

control is to establish a cost center or profit center, in which the head and all other
subordinate members are personally responsible for the revenue generated and the cost
incurred. In healthcare, the unit will also be responsible for clinical and quality decisions in
the management of patient care. Thus, all the members in the unit make a conscious effort
to control cost as well as to improve the quality and marketability of the services rendered.
When a senior physician takes charge of a unit, which is likely in many clinical units, he or
she will assume dual responsibility (clinical as well as administrative responsibility) of the
unit. If a clinical decision requires intensive and interactive professional judgment, all the
members in the unit will participate actively in the various clinical and administrative
decision making processes. For example, a nursing director will have to work closely with
in-charge physicians to meet the administratively set cost control goal for treatment
diagnoses and drug related costs. These goals should be set so that they directly affect the
remuneration of both physicians and nurses.
This arrangement is analogous to the product structure found in many service firms
today. The head of each unit specializes in providing a particular type of service, such as
Journal of Management Systems, Volume 6, Number 3, 1994
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pension consulting, healthcare audits, personal taxes, estate taxes, business valuation
services, to name only a few. The prices for these services are available in the external
market or may be negotiated with the buyer. If the market price for a particular service does
not cover its cost, then such a service may be contracted out to a lower-cost provider. The
major improvement offered by this structure is that the services provided by a particular
group of healthcare professionals are a product line of the hospital or provider organization.
The role of external constituents such as government would be to facilitate establishment of
reliable external market mechanisms for managing competition and requiring information
disclosures of price, quality and efficiency as is currently being proposed in the Clinton
administration's healthcare reform plan. This would be done for the majority of routine
medical services provided by hospitals today. If establishing external market mechanisms
for certain specialized services proves to be difficult, then direct rate regulation and
subsidies are supplemental policy tools that may be brought to bear in order to ensure the
continued provision of such services.
A Suggestion for Value Analysis of Activities
One of the important pre-conditions for cost control is that all the parties involved be
aware of the significance of cost management to organizational strategic goals. External
pressures, and internal structural rearrangement in response to these pressures, may create
an environment in which cost accounting professionals can perform a systematic
organizational intervention. This may help hospitals reduce intervention by outside interest
groups. Unless such a structural rearrangement is made, any cost control attempt will be
little more than an empty slogan, seen as a vehicle to justifying the costs already being
incurred. When attempts to justifY existing costs are strong, it will be more difficult for cost
accountants to obtain meaningful cost information in any type of a zero-based sense.

When conditions are appropriate and all constituents agree with the need for
controlling and managing costs, an ABC system will provide an effective cost control and
management tool. An ABC system will require attempts to classifY maj or activities in the
healthcare delivery process into (more or less) value added activities. An activity based
management system suggests to the organization to prioritize activities (e.g., lab tests) based
on their contribution to adding value in providing healthcare. Thereby, it is expected that
costs can be reduced without lowering the quality of services provided. However,
establishing such a system for a service industry like healthcare will not be easy. In the
following section, we discuss the potential use of such a system for hospitals, and make
suggestions for a conceptual framework of value analyses of activities in healthcare delivery
processes.
Unit of Analysis
For cost control, it is important to identifY a unit-cost center-and the person primarily
responsible for the unit. At the macro-level, an organization as a whole can be a unit for
which the CEO is responsible. Cost information of an organization can be examined and
compared to observe overall value-added from year to year. Value added of a hospital can
also be compared to the value added of similar hospitals to observe the hospital's relative
standing in cost management when providing comparable care.
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At the unit level, each relatively independent department can be a unit of analysis. The
department heads will ultimately be responsible for the cost effectiveness of their units,
given the allocated cost of the support units. Once a cost center is established, we can focus
attention at a micro-level to measure the specific cost saving opportunities. The individual
service-related activities of healthcare providers can be broken down on a cost/benefit basis
to allow such a micro-level unit for cost analysis. Thus, an ABC accounting system
attempts to come up with a list of m~or activities providers conduct in producing services
so that the costs of these activities can be calculated accurately and more meaningfully.
Value Analysis of Activities
The most important task, once such cost related information has been gathered for all
activities, is setting priorities: i.e., what activities are more critical or value-added? In
manufacturing organizations, ABC accountants trace the work flow and locate the value
chain based on the strategic goals of the firm. They attempt to minimize the cost of internal
processes that do not directly affect customer satisfaction. However, in hospitals, patients
are an integral part of the service delivery process, and it is difficult to separate the input
and through-put from the output. Therefore, there is a need for value judgments for each
activity in relation to its potential benefits for diagnosing symptoms. These activities should
be arranged in such a way that the more beneficial activities receive more support than the
less beneficial activities.
In order to determine the degree of value added of each activity, the clinical and
financial responsibilities of physicians and the hospital must be fused. As discussed, this
fusion can be attained by a traditional product design structure. Technology can also playa
role in saving cost by taking over routine, marginally beneficial activities that can be done
in a less costly manner. For instance, in many hospitals, storing and retrieving patients'
information have been replaced by an automated computer system, saving a tremendous
amount on staff-related costs.

Gnidelines for Value-Added Judgment
Value judgment of each and every activity is an important task for improving the cost
effectiveness of an organization, and it is a crucial part of an ABC system. The following
can serve as a guide for the value-added judgment of activities carried out in hospitals.
(1) Operational and Environmental Uncertainty
Activities that cope with higher uncertainty in a hospital should be considered to be
more value-adding activities. Uncertainty can result from internal operation as well as from
the external environment. If uncertainty is defined as not knowing of probable events and
their causes, then not knowing what is going to happen in the market (i.e., environmental
uncertainty) is as much a problem as not knowing how to conduct activities internally (i.e.,
operational uncertainty).

Operational uncertainty partiCUlarly comes from not knowing cause-and-effect
relationships, and an ABC system can provide a means of modeling such relationships.
Anyone who can effectively cope with uncertainties in an organization should be perceived
to be more influential (Hinings, Hickson, Pennings and Schneck, 1974). Therefore, any
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activity that is geared toward coping with the critical uncertainties of healthcare delivery
processes should be considered to be more important, and hence, more value-added.
(2) Strategic Focus
A critical activity for achieving the strategic goal of a hospital should be considered to
be a more value-added activity. Not all activities contribute equally to accomplishing the
strategic objective of an organization. Some activities are more critically related to the
strategic focus of an organization than others. It can be the case that different activities
suddenly become more critical than previously due to a change in strategic focus. Teams
that are more closely tied to such a new focus should command more resources. Once there
is a list of activities available, it is theoretically possible to rank order the criticality of each
activity for achieving an intended strategic goal. Since a change in a goal brings about a
change in the level of criticality of an activity, it is important to examine any changes taking
place both within and outside of an organization.
If a particular service is too expensive to obtain, even if it is critical for the strategic
focus, the organization should seek an alternative source for that activity. If necessary, an
organization should contract-out the services to a lower cost provider, rather than try to
provide the services internally. Under the current arrangement, administrators may not
make such decisions appropriately when they have reason to fear repercussions from losing
patient volume to another agency or organization.

(l) Non-routine and non-snbstitutability
Non-routine and non-substitutable tasks should be considered to be more value-added
than routine, substitutable tasks. Unlike an ABC system in the manufacturing sector, one
must consider the concept of value-added in the service sector as a continuum, rather than
as a dichotomy. Values added vary in degree on a continuum from less to more. Personnel
with less training should handle the less value-added tasks, or a cost-effective automated
system should take over such tasks. Technological advancement offers tremendous
opportunities for cost saving. Non-routine, non-programmable tasks require more cognitive
human judgment, more current information, and more extensive professional training.
Frequently, these non-routine tasks contribute extensively to solving or reducing
organizational uncertainties. Therefore, they should be perceived to be more important, and
thus, more value-added than routine tasks.
These guidelines form the basis of our conceptual framework for value analysis in
healthcare organizations. More detailed operational procedures for adoption of the system is
needed and will be addressed in our future research. For discussion of the current structural
arrangement for hospitals, we largely identify how difficult it is to design a meaningful cost
control mechanism for cost management in hospitals.

Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the current structural arrangement of both for-profit and
not-for-profit hospitals. For the most part, cost management is not currently a meaningful
strategic goal in either type of hospital. Particularly, in for-profit hospitals, administrators
and physicians have a symbiotic relationship: administrators provide the maximum
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professional autonomy to physicians and physicians bring in patients. Strategic goals of the
two parties have little to do with substantive cost control efforts. In state-run and universityrelated not-for-profit hospitals, the funding process does not appear to reinforce a policy of
cost effective treatment of diseases. We contend that the current structural arrangement in
the healthcare industry is not appropriate for reducing the costs of healthcare delivery
processes. Instead, we suggested a stronger organizational tie between administrators and
physicians in the hospital, such as an employer-employee type relationship found in HMOs
that will align the financial and clinical stakes of both parties. Such an arrangement should
better serve the needs of controlling costs and effective delivery of quality healthcare. We
believe that the mounting reform pressures for optimizing cost and quality of healthcare can
be met by an internal arrangement analogous to an integrated product line design. This
would place all medical professionals, their support personnel, and administration personnel
in a unified team. The team will be collectively responsible for managing the healthcare
services and their costs, quality and profitability.
We also suggested a framework for value analysis. This framework offers a theoretical
foundation that can be used to help hospitals develop an Activity Based Management
system. The success of this system requires a pre-condition: the need for a meaningful
structural rearrangement. Both external and internal pressures towards this structural
rearrangement are necessary for this endeavor, so that all the constituents of a hospital will
have the incentive to accept introduction of a substantive cost management system. In our
perspective, current National healthcare reform advocates who recommend imposing more
external pressures upon providers, not just regulatory pressures but more importantly,
market and informational measurement and disclosure pressures, are addressing salient
issues. Whether the legislative outcome of the reform process will be an improvement, or a
setback, will be partly contingent upon the successful implementation of such control
mechanisms.

•
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